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SOCIAL ADVISERS, SOCIAL ACCOUNTING,
AND THE PRESIDENCY
Wa=m F. MoNMALE*
On September io, 1970, the United States Senate passed S. 5, the Full Opportunity
and National Goals and Priorities Act. Among other things, the bill would have
established a Council of Social Advisers in the Executive Office of the President.'
The bill was not acted on by the House. However, Senate passage represents
significant progress for this measure, which did not even emerge from committee
when it was first proposed in 1967 as S. 843? I have re-introduced the bill in the
Ninety-second Congress, again as S. 5.
Tim ExEcuTrv OFFICE OF THE PESMENT
One might wonder why a United States Senator is so concerned about a
structural innovation in the President's office, but I believe that a review of the
case for such a Council and of the precedents regarding Executive Office structure
will show that Congressional impetus for this is both well-founded and appropriate
In the twenty-five years since the end of World War II, the Executive Office
of the President has undergone radical structural change. This is not readily
recognized, perhaps because of the staying power of the two best-known, general-
purpose staff units, namely the White House Office and the Bureau of the Budget
(now the Office of Management and Budget). Yet these are the only two present
units which were in the Executive Office in 1945.
It is also little realized that today's Executive Office contains sixteen separate units,
in contrast with four at the end of 1945, and that eleven of the present constituent
units have been established or significantly altered in the past ten years. So the
*United States Senator from Minnesota.
i S. 5, 9st Cong., 2d Sess. § zo3 (1970). As originally introduced, the bill would also have estab-
lished a Congressional Joint Committee on the Social Report, but this provision was deleted. See xz6 CoNo.
Rce. SIS,i63 (daily ed. Sept. io, 1970). Provision for a Congressional Office of Goals and Priorities
Analysis was added in Committee. S. 5, § 202. These latter provisions are not discussed in this article,
which is intended to focus on the more directly presidential issues.
'S. 843, 9oth Cong., ist Sess. (1967). The hearings on this bill were published in three parts in
z968. See Hearings on S. 843 Before the Subcomm. on Government Research of the Senate Comm. on
Government Operations, 9oth Cong., ist Sess. (xg68). Among those participating in these hearings
were Dr. Bertram M. Gross, a Political Science Professor, and Joseph Kraft, a journalist, who were early
advocates of a Council of Social Advisers.
t The White House Office and the Office of Management and Budget, as Executive office units, date back
to 1939. Since then the following additions have been made: Council of Economic Advisers (1946);
National Security Council (1949); National Aeronautics and Space Council (xg6i); Office of Emergency
Preparedness (196r); Office of Science and Technology (1962); Office of Special Representative for Trade
Negotiations (z963); Office of Consumer Affairs (1964); Office of Economic Opportunity (1964);
National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development (1966); Office of the Vice Pres-
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structure of the Office is quite fluid and, increasingly, specialized. It is against this
background that the proposal to establish yet another unit-a Council of Social
Advisers-must be evaluated.
II
WHAT A COUNCIL op SOcIAL ADvisERs WouLD Do
With the steady evolution of the Executive Office's composition, it seems clear
that the question is not whether we should consider establishing new units in the
Executive Office but rather, which ones, and when. Under my proposal, the Council
of Social Advisers (CSA) would be composed of three of the nation's most gifted
and respected social analysts (appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate) and staffed by a number of America's brightest young social scientists.
The CSA would be responsible for monitoring, on an on-going basis, specific and
actual conditions in the country which affect the "social opportunity" of our
people. Developing a system of "social indicators" would be a principal task of the
Council
A chief objective of such an agency would be to enlarge the chances each of
our citizens has to develop his potential to the fullest. That is why I have called
the proposal the "Full Opportunity Act." Indeed, the bill stipulates, really for the
first time in our history, "the opportunity to live in decency and dignity"5 as a
national goal for all of our citizens.
The bill also provides for an annual report of the President on the nation's social
status. Requiring the President to report annually on such areas as education,
health, housing, alienation, political participation, personal security, and social
mobility would do far more than assure the publication of CSA findings and
recommendations: It would guarantee such societal knowledge visibility of the
sort that only presidential involvement can generate.
It has been asked whether the state of the art in social accounting and the state
of the art in the social sciences warrant the formalization in statute of social
accounting and reporting requirements. Much of America's turmoil in the I96O's
grew out of massive frustration at continuing social unfulfilIment. That frustration
mysteriously eluded the attention of decisionmakers, in both the public and private
sectors, until the time for defusing the bomb had all but slipped away. Tragically,
that should never have been the case. For in truth, the real conditions of explosive
neighborhoods in Watts, Detroit Newark, and elsewhere were known-and their
implications understood-by a variety of social scientists who not only possessed
such publicly-useful knowledge but published it as well.
ident (1969); Office of Intergovernmental Relations (I969); Council on Environmental Quality (1970);
Office of Telecommunications Policy (r970); and Domestic Council (1970).
'See espedally SOciAL INDICATORS (R. Bauer ed. x966) for a comprehensive review of the concept
of social indicators and social accounting.
' S. 5, 9st Cong., 2d Sess. § IOI (,970).
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To our collective sorrow, most of those studies remained buried in the for-
bidding pages of the scholarly journals of a dozen or more academic disciplines,
ranging from anthropology to political science. One can only imagine how different
,the tumultuous decade just ended might have been had there existed then the sort
of mechanism for monitoring and reporting social conditions I am proposing.
Thus it becomes clear that the social sciences do have something to contribute
to the process of rationalizing public policymaking. The social sciences have
demonstrated in recent years both a rediscovered interest in social problem-solving
and a dedication to the development of research tools which serve this end.
During the three years that my proposal has been before the Congress, the
objective of social reporting has been widely accepted. Both the Johnson and Nixon
Administrations have based their opposition on the structural changes proposed
by the bill, but they have pledged themselves to further the developmenb of social
accounting. In fact, -the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare pro-
duced in January 1969 a document entitled Toward a Sodal Report.0 As rudi-
mentary as this pilot effort was, it illustrates that we can begin whenever we are
ready.7
In the four years since I first introduced the "Full Opportunity Act," a number
of individuals and study groups have determined that it is time to establish a
Council of Social Advisers and to provide for an annual Social Report. For
example, in October 1969 the Behavioral and Social Sciences Survey Committee of
the National Academy of Sciences-Social Science Research Council recommended the
preparation of an annual social report, initially outside of the government but
with the aid of federal fundsYS The Committee also recommended the subsequent
establishment of a Council of Social Advisers. In December 1969, the National
Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence also recommended that
consideration be given to the establishment of such a council and to the preparation
of a social report?
III
NEED POR A SociL AccOUING SYSTEM
A second point which must be made was strongly underscored by the hearings
held on the CSA proposal in both the Ninetieth and Ninety-first Congresses. Put
succinctly, hunch, intuition, and good intentions have been the heavy artillery of
U.S. DEP'T oF HEALTr, EnucAnON, AND WmEi.an, TowaRD A SOCIAL REPORT (5969).
The hearings on S. 5 contain testimony and an extensive bibliographic section documenting more
fully the state of the art in social accounting. See Hearings on S. 5 Before the Special Subcomm. on
Evaluation of Social Programs of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, gist Cong., xst &
2d Sess. (970).
SNAiONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, THn BEnAvioRAL AND
SOCIAL SCIENCES: OurrLoO Aun NEEDS (1970).
0 To EsTABLis JusTicE, To INSURE DOMETIC TRANQUILITY, FINAL REPORT or Tm NATONAL Co-
2aI5ION ON TE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE 272 (1969).
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social problem-solvers, to a far greater extent than anyone has recognized. This
point was made most forcefully in the testimony of Mr. Joseph A. Califano, Jr.,
principal domestic policy assistant in the Johnson White House (and now a sup-
porter of S. 5) who observed, at a December 1969 hearing:
The disturbing truth is that the basis of recommendations by an American
Cabinet ,2fficer on whether to begin, eliminate or expand vast social programs
more nea~y resembles the intuitive judgment of a benevolent tribal chief in remote
Africa than the elaborate sophisticated data with which the Secretary of Defense
supports a major new weapons system.10
He also related the experience he had when, in i965, the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare did not even know the composition of welfare rolls.
There was-and still is-the myth that there are vast numbers of able-bodied men
receiving welfare.
When the welfare data were finally obtained, almost two years later, we learned
that of the 7-3 million then on welfare:
-3.5 million were children
-2.1 million were women over 65
-- 7o0,oo were handicapped or blind
-9oooo were mothers of the children
-io,ooo were males who were incapacitated beyond any ability to work or be
trained
-and 5oooo, less than one-tenth of one per cent, were males who could possibly
be called "able-bodied."11
Despite such experiences, the Johnson Administration believed that sufficient
progress in social accounting could be made through the existing executive struc-
tures. It pointed particularly to the Bureau of the Budget, the Council of Economic
Advisers, and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. It also thought
the Program Planning and Budgeting System, which it had initiated in 1965, would
greatly improve analysis of social programs by the operating agencies and the
presidential staff.
It is true that efforts to predict and evaluate the effects of social programs have
expanded greatly. But we are already suffering from the fact that such efforts
are scattered and unconnected.
When the Nixon Administration first assumed office in 1969, it found an
elaborate review of the cost-effectiveness of various Economic Opportunity Act
programs, which the General Accounting Office had prepared on order of the
Congress. Somewhere in the midst of the study were data which ultimately proved
disastrous to the Job Corps. The GAO figures showed that the annual cost for
"Statement of Joseph A. Califano, Jr., in Hearings on S. 5, supra note 7, at 204.
11Id. at 209-10.
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
training a Job Corps enrollee ranged between $6ooo and $8ooo. They also showed
that only sixty-five per cent of participants could be classed as successful.
The central difficulty, from a policy point of view, was one which unfortunately
occupied little if any of the time or attention of those who ultimately decided the
fate of the Job Corps. Questions there were that deserved to be asked and an-
swered:
Is it really such an outrage to spend $3ooo to $4000 for six months' t4,mng of an
urban youngster with a wretchedly deprived background and no future but one most
likely to be devoted to crime or waste?
What would it cost society to keep such a person in prison or on welfare?
Given the difficulty of the problem, is a sixty-five per cent success rate really poor,
or is it possibly a great achievement?
Most importantly, what other programs were there to use which would offer a
higher success rate, a lower cost, or both?
What future might have awaited the Job Corps had questions such as these
been asked and answered can only be left to conjecture. For in due course some
i7,ooo youngsters who had found new hope in the Job Corps fell under the axe of
an unusually cruel system of social accounting. Indeed, several months later, the
Administration was unable even to locate almost one-half of these young people,
though it had promised to transfer them all to other manpower programs.
The danger of piecemeal social accounting was underscored when a number of
us in Congress asked for data which would permit a comparative analysis of the
Job Corps with a variety of other manpower programs favored by the Admin-
istration. Several weeks later the GAO, following repeated congressional inquiries,
produced a table which featured the number "2." This was a footnote which said
that the data were "not available."
Subsequent experience with alternative manpower programs suggests that the
Job Corps was, and is, relatively effective after all. For example, it turned out that
there were no placement data on the JOBS program, which was initially favored
by the Administration. Later, we learned that this was one of the poorest manpower
programs, with a success rate of only thirty to fifty per cent. So it would seem that a
partial system of social accounting permits, or perhaps encourages, unwise decisions.
Now that we have gone so far in measurement and evaluation, I think we dare not
stop.
IV
NEED FOR STRuCTURAL CHANGE
Surely it was at least in partial recognition of this decision-making deficiency
in the American political system that, less than six months after having assumed
office, President Nixon created a National Goals Research Staff (NGRS) on
July 12, I969.P Physically and organizationally located within the White House
2 Only three days earlier, the Bureau of the Budget had opposed S. 5 on behalf of the Administra.
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itself, the NGRS was from the outset over-shadowed by the larger political im-
peratives which confronted the Administration. Overseeing the work of the NGRS
was but one of several responsibilities of a member of the White House staff, Mr.
Leonard Garment.
The NGRS was commissioned originally to undertake a comprehensive review
of the nation's objectives in the years immediately ahead and to prepare a report
each year on the Fourth of July. Ultimately it produced a first, and final, com-
pilation of potential problems which could come to plague the American people 8
So disturbingly wanting was the report that the New York Times observed editorially
that it represented a "disappointing evasion of responsibility."' 4 Moreover, the
Times editorial continued,
The 169-page report, plus appendices, which was a year in the making, sets
forth neither goals nor priorities. "The Staff did not have a goal-setting function,"
the report contends. If not, this White House task force was either misnamed or
misdirected, or both.15
As is so frequently the case with organizational changes not based on statute,
the NGRS effort aborted at some critical juncture. Those not privy to the
pressures which played upon that small group may never know with certainty
either the reason for the project's demise or the point at which it came. Still the
experience of the NGRS may be instructive.
The point to be made is simply that the Nixon Administration's early efforts
to achieve improved social policymaking have not succeeded. In disbanding the
NGRS, the White House announced that its work would be carried on by the new
Domestic Council. Thus we have seen two administrations rely, at one time
or another, on the Budget Bureau, the Council of Economic Advisers, the Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare, a new National Goals Research Staff,
and a new Domestic Council to do a job which both agreed needs doing. So the
relevant question is, when will such disparate and disconnected impulses be gotten
together into some sort of comprehensive, systematic enterprise which has a decent
chance for perseverance and productivity?
I am convinced that the day will not dawn when such irrational policy judg-
ments as that involved in the Job Corps illustration are no longer made until
America is provided with a new statutorily-mandated governmental structure.
This structure must be capable of synthesizing our knowledge in the social area
and proceeding directly to obliterate current gaps in that knowledge. Surely the
unhappy experience of the NGRS underscores the need for a status which assures
tion, principally on the grounds that a new structure was not needed and would only be duplicative.
See Statement of Maurice Mann, Assistant Director, Bureau of the Budget, in id. at 144-45.
" TowAnD BALA1cED Gaowmr: QuAwnTr wrnr QUALiTY, REPORT op "rim NATIONAL GoALs RE-
sEARcH STAFF (1970).
" What Goals?, N.Y. Times, July 21, 197o, at 34, col. I.
's Id.
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continuity. And no good can come from continuing to make decisions based on
the chance availability of unconnected social measurements and evaluations.
So critical is the range of social problems confronting our country today that
we can no longer afford the idle luxury of what John Gardner has so eloquently
and tellingly termed "stumbling into the future." With a gunstock full of
notches commemorating such disastrous undertakings as that of the NGRS, now
is the time to target our hopes for improved social policymaking in one direction
and one direction only. I believe that the creation of some sort of mechanism
capable of comprehensively analyzing social conditions in this country, and report-
ing factually on those conditions to -the President, the Congress, and the country,
is the direction in which we now must move. We have already invested tremendous
amounts of energy, talent, and money in cost-benefit analysis, experimentation with
planning-programming-budgeting systems, and a wide variety of program evaluation
techniques. Is it not now appropriate to move unhesitatingly toward a more
sophisticated level of institutionalized structures competent to the task and re-
sponsible for performing it?
V
THE COUNCIL, THE CONG SS, AND THE PRESIDENT
Some observers, who agree that we need a system of social accounting and that
a new statutory structure is the only way to bring it about, nevertheless harbor one
further concern. What chance, they ask, is there that even a council created by
statute could effectively do all of these things which need doing so urgently if
it is unwanted by the President?
Surely no one would suggest that the conclusions and recommendations in
the annual social report prepared by a Council of Social Advisers for the Pres-
ident and the Congress would run counter to the thinking of the President or
his Administration. Yet, such a report would necessarily contain data and analysis
which might lead other commentators to different conclusions.
Mr. Charles Schultze, former Director of the Bureau of the Budget has said:
The United States budget is not the document of an executive whose decisions
are law, nor of a prime minister whose party must support him or bring down
the government. It is, rather, a set of proposals to the Congress for action on
appropriations and tax measures. Precisely because it must advocate the course
recommended by the President, the budget cannot emphasize the difficulty of
the choices made. It records the President's decisions, but it does not identify
the close ones. Alternatives that were serious contenders for adoption but were
finally rejected are seldom if ever mentioned. In some cases, programs generally
recognized as ineffective or of low priority are debated but finally left un-
changed because all participants in the debate realize how few are the lances a
President can afford to break against politically impregnable targets. Thus, the
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budget is a document designed to persuade an independent Congress rather
than to analyze policy alternatives.1"
Even if we had reason to believe that a comprehensive system of social account-
ing would be promptly initiated by the executive branch, without a statutory
requirement, there would be a sound basis for legislation. The Congress also must
have access to such information. Prestigious members of a statutory council, sub-
ject to Senate confirmation and available to testify before congressional committees
on their findings, would assure the Congress and the public of the required quality
and visibility of their work. Further, the tension between the council members
and the Congress should elevate the level of analysis in the same way that our
understanding of economics has been enhanced through the hearings on the
Economic Report.
There is ample precedent, since the Second World War, for the establishment
of specialized councils which (a) were essentially foisted on given administrations
and (b) have proved to be meritorious additions to the federal government's
structure, notwithstanding initial executive opposition.
Certainly the Council of Economic Advisers, created by the Employment Act
of 1946,17 supports this thesis. Similarly, the National Security Council, established
in 1947,18 and the Council on Environmental Quality, 9 set up only a year ago,
came to occupy respected positions even within administrations which initially
opposed them. The Nixon Administration, for example, opposed incipient con-
gressional efforts to highlight the ecological crisis by a statutory prescription for top-
level presidential and congressional advice. Yet when signing into law the measure
creating the new Council, the President heralded the action as one opening a new
decade of the environment, and he has used it widely and effectively since then.
History compels the conclusion that Presidents use, in varying degree, all of
the statutorily-created structures in the executive branch. Moreover, they tend to
use most vigorously and trustingly those bodies which draw esteem and respect
both to themselves and their President. Thus it may safely be concluded that a
Council of Social Advisers which performed satisfactorily its mission of measuring
and monitoring and reporting on social conditions in America would, far from
meeting perpetual presidential resistance and rancor, come in time to enjoy a
position of trust and respect. From such a position it could reasonably be an-
ticipated that the Council could began to elevate social policymaking in America
to new levels of sophistication.
CONCLUSION
The principal concern of this essay has been the interrelationship between a
1 8 C. ScmmTzn ET AL., SETriNG NATIONAL PIuo MEs 4 (97o).
1 Ch. 33, 6o Stat. 23.
18 National Security Act of 1947, di. 343, 61 Stat. 495-
1" National Environmental Policy Act of x969, 83 Stat. 852.
504 LAw AND CONTEMPoRARY PRoBLEMs
proposed federal mechanism for improving social policymaking and the office of
President of the United States. Is there some possibility that even a valuable new
council would contribute to overburdening him with specialized advisory units?
I believe a Council of Social Advisers, charged with the responsibility for ad-
vancing and asserting existing knowledge of real social facts about this society,
should serve to integrate, coordinate, and systematize the now dissident and dis-
cordant efforts of social planners and evaluators wherever they may be located
within the federal government.
Moreover, the CSA should, in operation, synthesize advisory inputs which now
compete for individual, isolated attention, thus reducing the cumulative advice-
receiving burden of the President. Additionally, in synthesizing available informa-
tion, the CSA would be speaking to the President-and to the Congress and the
country-in a voice which, while a blend of many voices, would still be coherent.
Finally, I believe that we shall never begin 'to end our hopeless method of making
social policy decisions of the most sensitive sort on the basis of hunch, intuition,
and good intentions until we move in the direction pointed to by this legislative
proposal. The enactment of legislation creating a comprehensive advisory role in
the social policy area will, I believe, radically alter not only the process by which
decisionmakers choose, but ultimately the choices which are made.
When President Nixon established the National Goals Research Staff in July
1969, he stated that the report to be prepared by the unit should "serve as a
focus for the kind of lively widespread public discussion that deserves to go
into decisions affecting our common future.""0  The document which ultimately
emanated from the NGRS could not begin to serve the critical focusing function
the President had envisioned for it. After a round of newspaper comments, it
disappeared from view. No congressional committee held hearings on it. A Council
of Social Advisers, speaking social facts to the American people in a clear and
coherent voice, could provide the kind of focus the President asked for.
When, finally, such a Council is created-as I think is very likely-it will be
a most fitting recognition of the firm resolve of our people to govern themselves
rightly and intelligently and of the efforts of many, along the way, to make a
start toward the objective so well stated by Abraham Lincoln: "If we could first
know where we are, and whither we are tending, we could better judge what to do,
and how to do it."' 1
20 5 WEE.LY Coma'. PAss. Doe. 982, 984 (1969).
"
1 Address delivered by Abraham Lincoln Before the Republican State Convention, Springfield, Ill.,
June 16, 1858, in 3 Co PLET- WoRxs OF ABRAHAm LINCOLN I (J. Nicolay & J. Hay eds. x9o5).
